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We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study
the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where
agents who make decisions using either automatic or controlled processing compete with each other
for survival. Agents using automatic processing act quickly and so are more likely to acquire
resources, but agents using controlled processing are better planners and so make more effective use
of the resources they have. Using the replicator equation, we characterize the conditions under which
automatic or controlled agents dominate, when coexistence is possible, and when bistability occurs.
We then extend the replicator equation to consider feedback between the state of the population
and the environment. Under conditions where having a greater proportion of controlled agents
either enriches the environment or enhances the competitive advantage of automatic agents, we find
that limit cycles can occur, leading to persistent oscillations in the population dynamics. Critically,
however, these limit cycles only emerge when feedback occurs on a sufficiently long time scale.
Our results shed light on the connection between evolution and human cognition, and demonstrate
necessary conditions for the rise and fall of rationality.
Dual-process theories of human cognition play
a central role in the behavioral sciences. Accord-
ing to these theories, decisions are often made
using either automatic processes which are fast
and effortless but focused on the present, or con-
trolled processes which are slow and effortful but
can plan for the future. Evolutionary game the-
ory models, however, almost never consider these
distinctions. Therefore, little is known about the
evolutionary dynamics of automatic versus con-
trolled processing. Here, we address this gap
by introducing an analytically tractable model
for the evolution of agents that use automatic or
controlled processing. The agents both compete
with each other and alter their shared environ-
ment. We show that under certain circumstances,
automatic and controlled processing can stably
coexist within the population. We also identify
conditions under which limit cycles occur. In
such cases, the success of controlled agents alters
the environment in a way that allows automatic
agents to invade, and vice versa. Our results help
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to explain why human evolution may not neces-
sarily be characterized by ever-increasing levels of
rationality and forward-thinkingness, but instead
may recurrently fall prey to periods of myopia.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dual-process theories of human decision-making con-
ceptualize decisions as arising from the interaction of (i)
automatic processes that are “hardwired” and thus com-
putationally efficient but rigid; and (ii) controlled pro-
cesses that are effortful but flexible [1–7]. Such a perspec-
tive has proved useful for understanding behavior across
a wide range of domains, and has been used heavily in
fields such as neuroscience [8, 9], cognitive and social psy-
chology [10–16], and behavioral economics [17–19]. Yet,
despite playing a key role in human evolution, the inter-
action (and conflict) between automatic and controlled
processing has been almost entirely overlooked by evolu-
tionary game theorists.
Controlled processing is a defining feature of human
cognition, thought to underlie virtually all higher level,
characteristically human cognitive functions, such as
planning, problem-solving reasoning, and symbolic lan-
guage – functions that, at least under some conditions,
are capable of identifying and executing rational and even
optimal behavior. This might be taken to suggest that
evolution should favor controlled processing, and that
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2given sufficient time, control should prevail as the domi-
nant mode of cognition. However, there is evidence that
human history is characterized by cyclical dynamics that
suggest a proliferation of behaviors and social structures
reflective of controlled processing, only to be followed by
their demise and collapse [20, 21]. What might explain
these historical cycles? Here, we explore the possibility
that they may reflect the dynamics of interaction between
automatic and controlled processing at the population
level. We do so by integrating dual-process agents into
an evolutionary game-theoretic framework.
We focus our investigation of automatic versus con-
trolled processing on a particular cognitive function: in-
tertemporal choice [22–24]. Intertemporal choice refers
to decisions between options or behaviors that yield im-
mediate reward versus those that are less rewarding in
the short run, but have the potential to yield greater
reward in the future.
We choose to focus on intertemporal choice for three
reasons. First, the prevalence of short-sighted behavior
has been identified as an important contributory factor to
the demise of advanced civilizations [20], and is a topic of
modern concern (e.g., failures to save, over-consumption
of environmental resources, and abuse of antibiotics).
Second, immediacy-biased behaviors have been linked
to automatic processing, while future-oriented behaviors
have been linked to the engagement of controlled pro-
cessing, both at the behavioral and neural levels of anal-
ysis [9, 17, 19, 25]. Thus, intertemporal choice may be
a useful probe for studying the consequences of interac-
tions between automatic and controlled processing at the
population level. Third, we have performed preliminary
computer simulations that support this suggestion [26].
In these simulations, agents foraged for resources (e.g.,
food) in an environment, and either consumed found re-
sources immediately (when using automatic processing),
or according to an optimal consumption plan calculated
using a complex algorithm based on past experience. In-
triguingly, these simulations sometimes gave rise to evo-
lutionary cycles in which the proportion of controlled
agents in the population waxed and waned periodically.
However, the complexity of the model led to analytical
intractability, making it hard to understand what con-
ditions gave rise to these cyclical dynamics, and what
factors were responsible for the oscillations.
A desire to understand these issues led us to the sim-
plified model proposed in this paper. Using the replicator
equation, a nonlinear dynamical system studied in evo-
lutionary game theory [27, 28], we introduce a minimal
model of dual-process agents engaged in intertemporal
choice that captures the critical features of the scenario
above while remaining sufficiently simple to be mathe-
matically tractable. In doing so, we provide a formal
characterization of the conditions under which cyclical
dynamics emerge, and the forces that drive such cycles.
II. THE MODEL
We model a world in which agents forage for goods,
compete for access to these goods, and choose how to
consume goods they acquire to generate fitness, with fit-
ness being subject to diminishing marginal returns on
consumption. Agents are then subject to natural selec-
tion based on their resulting fitnesses.
For simplicity, we assume there are only two types of
agents, fully controlled and fully automatic, and we ex-
plore the evolution of the fraction of controlled agents,
denoted as x. Automatic agents differ from controlled
agents in two ways: how likely they are acquire goods
(where the speed and efficiency of automaticity is ad-
vantageous), and how they choose to consume those re-
sources (where the rationality and planning ability of
control is advantageous).
The world is parametrized by the probability ρ of find-
ing a good (all goods are of equal size, normalized to 1
energy unit), and the competitive advantage β that au-
tomatic agents have over controlled agents in acquiring
goods (where β = 0 means that both types of agents have
an equal probability of acquiring goods).
A. Competitive advantage
Because automatic processing is assumed to be faster
and less taxing than controlled processing, automatic
agents have a competitive advantage over controlled
agents when seeking to acquire goods. For example, it
could be that when agents of both types simultaneously
encounter a good, the automatic agent acts more quickly
and snatches the good before the controlled agent can
respond. Or it could be that the ponderous deliberation
engaged in by controlled agents sometimes causes them
to miss opportunities that an automatic agent would be
more likely to exploit.
As a result, automatic agents are more likely to
acquire a good in any given time period, and so the
two types of agents differ in their expected waiting time
between acquiring goods (i.e., the average number of
time steps between acquiring one good and the next).
We define the probability of acquiring a good as pA for
automatic agents, and pC for controlled agents. Thus
the average waiting time for an automatic agent τA is
given by
τA =
1
pA
, with pA = ρ(1 + βx), (1)
while the average waiting time for a controlled agent τC
is given by
τC =
1
pC
, with pC = ρ(1− β(1− x)). (2)
For ρ > 0 and β > 0, it is the case that τA < τC :
automatic agents acquire goods more frequently than
3controlled agents (again, because automatic processing
is faster and more efficient).
B. Consumption
To implement diminishing marginal returns on re-
source consumption, we define the fitness gained from
consuming a fraction z of a good as z/(a + z), where a
controls the extent of diminishing marginal returns, with
lower a leading to more steeply diminishing returns. Re-
call that goods are normalized to have size 1 when ac-
quired.
When automatic agents acquire a good, they consume
all of it immediately; hence z = 1, yielding a fitness ben-
efit of 1/(a+ 1). They then spend, on average, the next
τA − 1 time steps consuming nothing, until they again
acquire a good. Therefore the expected fitness per time
step of an automatic agent is given by
fA =
1
1+a
τA
=
ρ+ βρx
a+ 1
, (3)
from Eq. (1).
In contrast, controlled agents consume acquired re-
sources more carefully: they pace their consumption,
spreading it out evenly so as to obtain the maximum
possible amount of fitness gain from it. (Because of the
diminishing marginal returns on consumption, it is waste-
ful to consume the entire resource immediately; evenly
spaced consumption results in greater fitness yield.)
Thus, the prudent planning of controlled agents leads
them to consume z = 1/τC units of good in each of the
τC time steps, and thereby to gain a fitness benefit
fC =
1
τC
a+ 1τC
=
ρ(β(x− 1) + 1)
a+ ρ(β(x− 1) + 1) , (4)
from Eq. (2).
III. EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS IN A
CONSTANT ENVIRONMENT
Having defined the fitness of the two types of agents,
we turn to evolutionary dynamics. Specifically, we ask
which strategy (or combination of the two) will be favored
by natural selection for different fixed values of resource
availability ρ and competitive advantage of automatic
agents β. We do so using the replicator equation from
evolutionary game theory [27, 28] to characterize how the
relative fractions of controlled and automatic agents, x
and 1 − x, respectively, vary over time. The replicator
equation compares the fitness of controlled agents to the
population average fitness. It increases the frequency of
controlled agents over time if they have higher fitness
than automatic agents, and decreases it if the opposite is
true.
The replicator equation for our system, using (3) and
(4), is given by
x˙ = x(fC − (xfC + (1− x)fA))
= (x− 1)x
(
a
a− βρ+ ρ+ βρx +
ρ+ βρx
a+ 1
− 1
)
.(5)
Note that we do not need a separate equation for the frac-
tion of automatic agents because that quantity is given
by 1 − x. The long-term dynamics of (5) are character-
ized in Fig. 1(a), where for the sake of illustration we fix
a = 0.15 and vary β and ρ. We see that the (β, ρ) space
is subdivided into five distinct regions. We describe the
dynamics within each region below.
FIG. 1: (Color online) Bifurcation analysis of Eq. (5).
(a) Stability diagram (left) and phase portraits (right)
for Eq. (5) with a = 0.15. Transcritical bifurcation,
green curves; Saddle-node bifurcation, red curve. (b)
Fitnesses fC and fA as functions of pA and pC , for
a = 0.15. (c) Areas of regions (1)-(5) in the stability
diagram, as function of a.
4The endpoint solutions of x = 0 (all automatic agents)
and x = 1 (all controlled agents) are always fixed points
regardless of β and ρ. In regions 2 and 4, these are the
only fixed points. When resources are scarce and the
competitive advantage of automatics is low (region 2),
x = 1 is the global attractor and control dominates auto-
matic processing. Conversely, when resources are plenti-
ful and the competitive advantage of automatics is high
(region 4), x = 0 is the global attractor and automatic
processing dominates control. This is because on the one
hand, automatic agents always consume ρβ more goods
on average than controlled agents in each time step (given
(1) and (2)); but on the other hand, controlled agents
make more judicious use of those resources (as controlled
by a). Therefore, for a given value of a, control wins when
ρβ is sufficiently small and automaticity wins when ρβ is
large. The smaller a is (i.e., the greater the diminishing
marginal returns on consumption), the larger region 2 is
and the smaller region 4 is.
In the other regions, however, there can be up to two
interior fixed points, in addition to these endpoint solu-
tions. The first results from having a relatively resource-
rich world with relatively little competitive advantage of
automatics (regions 2 and 5). This interior fixed point
is always stable, and leads to coexistence of automatic
and controlled processing. The second results from a
relatively resource poor world in which the competitive
advantage of automatics is relatively common (regions 3
and 5). This interior fixed point, by contrast, is always
unstable and leads to bistability between automatic and
controlled processing.
To understand why a rich world with little competi-
tive advantage for automatics leads to coexistence while
a poor world with high competitive advantage for auto-
matics leads to bistability, we must consider how selec-
tion pressure varies based on the makeup of the popula-
tion. In general, coexistence occurs when each strategy
is at an advantage when it is rare, whereas bistability
occurs when each strategy is at a disadvantage when it
is rare. From (1) and (2), we see that increasing the
fraction of controlled agents x by a given amount also
increases the probability of finding a resource for both
types of agents (pA and pC) equally, regardless of ρ and
β. Therefore, what determines the dynamics when x is
small versus large is how x (and the resulting increase
in the probability of finding a good) translates into fit-
ness for automatic versus controlled agents (which does
depend on ρ and β). From (3) and (4), we see that fA
is linear in pA, whereas fC is a nonlinear function of pC
(see Fig.1(b)). Thus, because of the concavity of fC , an
increase in the fraction of controlled agents can have dif-
ferent effects on the relative fitness of automatic versus
controlled processing depending on ρ and β.
In a rich world (ρ large) with relatively weak com-
petitive advantage for automatics (β small), as found in
region 1, resources are common and pC and pA are rela-
tively close to 1. Thus the dynamics sit in a region where
the fC curve in fig. 1.b has a shallower slope than that
of the linear fA curve. Consequently, going from x = 0
to x = 1 leads to a bigger increase in fitness for auto-
matic agents than controlled agents. As a result, this
produces a situation in which (with the right ρ and β)
control outperforms automatic near x = 0 (when con-
trol is rare), but as x increases, the advantage of control
dissipates and reverses such that automatic outperforms
control near x = 1. Thus neither endpoint is stable, lead-
ing to coexistence.
Different dynamics occur in a poor world (ρ small)
where the competitive advantage for automatics is high
and β is large (region 3). Here, pC and pA are relatively
close to 0. In this case, the slope of fC is larger than
that of fA, and thus going from x = 0 to x = 1 leads
to a greater increase in fitness for controlled agents than
automatic agents. This produces a situation in which au-
tomatic agents outperform controlled agents near x = 0,
whereas controlled agents outperform automatic agents
near x = 1. Thus both endpoints are stable, leading to
bistability.
Finally, when both ρ and β are moderately high (region
5), the resulting long-term dynamics are a mix of regions
1 and 2, with bistability occurring between x = 0 and a
stable interior fixed point (i.e., coexistence).
Fig. 1(c) shows the areas of the five regions in Fig. 1(a)
as the parameter a increases. Increasing a increases the
size of the region in (β, ρ) space where automatic agents
dominate (region 4) and drastically decreases the regions
corresponding to bistability, coexistence, or dominance
of controlled agents (regions 1, 2, 3, and 5).
IV. FEEDBACK BETWEEN THE
POPULATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT
In Section III we assumed that the environment is con-
stant, such that the parameters ρ and β are fixed.
There are many situations, however, in which the current
makeup of the population can influence the environment,
often with some lag [20, 21, 29]. Thus in this section, we
extend the model from Section III to incorporate such
feedback effects. To do so, we introduce a modified ver-
sion of the replicator equation that includes additional
differential equations describing how the environmental
parameters β and ρ vary with x, the fraction of controlled
agents in the population. In Section IV.A, we analyze a
system in which an increase in controlled processing in-
creases β, thus augmenting the competitive advantage of
automatic agents. In Section IV.B, we analyze a system
in which an increase in controlled processing increases
ρ. This scenario models a situation where greater use of
controlled processing enriches the environment and en-
hances resource availability for everyone, thanks (for ex-
ample) to increased technological innovation leading to
greater agricultural output. In Section IV.C, we analyze
a system with both of these features.
5A. Scenario 1: Controlled processing increases
competitive advantage of automaticity
Here we consider the consequences of allowing β to pos-
itively co-vary with x. This implements a scenario in
which having more controlled agents leads to greater pop-
ulation density and thus a larger β. The increase in pop-
ulation density could reflect larger population size, which
results directly from the fact that populations with more
controlled agents have higher average fitness. Alterna-
tively, it could reflect an externality such as cognitive
control allowing people to live more densely without vi-
olent conflict.
To link β and x, we introduce a differential equation
on β that pulls its value towards the current value of
x. We also incorporate the possibility of lag, specified
by a parameter τβ . This lag captures the effect that an
increase in x at time t does not always have an immediate
impact on β. For example, increased birth rates do not
immediately lead to larger numbers of competing adults.
The new system is given by
x˙ = x(fC − (xfC + (1− x)fA))
β˙ =
x− β
τβ
. (6)
After insertion of (3) and (4), (6) becomes
x˙ = (x− 1)x
(
a
a− βρ+ ρ+ βρx +
ρ+ βρx
a+ 1
− 1
)
.
β˙ =
x− β
τβ
(7)
Note that the x˙ replicator equation is the same as it
was previously, except that now β is also a variable. Also
note that in equilibrium, β = x.
To illustrate how this addition of feedback between the
population and the environment affects the dynamics, we
begin by fixing a = 0.8 and examining the effect of ρ and
τβ (Fig. 2(a) and 3). We find three possible types of long-
term dynamics: dominance of controlled agents (region
1, no interior fixed point); coexistence of automatic and
controlled agents (region 3, stable interior fixed point);
and limit cycles in which both types of agents are present
but their relative abundances oscillate (region 2, unstable
interior fixed point).
The parameter regime in Fig. 2(a) for which limit cy-
cles exist is bounded by two vertical asymptotes, and
within that strip, τβ must be sufficiently large. In
Fig. 2(a), a = 0.8 and limit cycles exist if 0.1 < ρ < 0.52
and τβ > 104.47. Specifically, the limit cycles are born
in a supercritical Hopf bifurcation. The equation of the
Hopf bifurcation curve has been computed analytically
and is too complicated to show.
We conclude this section by asking how a, the ex-
tent of diminishing marginal returns on consumption,
changes the dynamics of Eq. (5) (Fig. 3). We find that
only the three types of dynamics observed in Figs. 3 and
Figs. 2(b)-(d) are possible: if ρ < (a+1)/2, the long-term
FIG. 2: (Color online) Bifurcation analysis of Eq. (7)
with a = 0.8 and τβ = 400. (a) Stability diagram. Hopf
bifurcation, blue curve. (b) Time series of a typical
solution in region 1 with ρ = 0.1. (c) Time series of a
typical solution in region 2 with ρ = 0.2. (d) Time series
of region 3 with ρ = 0.65.
6FIG. 3: (Color online) Characterization of the (x, β)
system from Eq. (7)
behavior is dominance of controlled agents (no interior
fixed point); if ρ > (a + 1)/2 and ρ > ρ∗, the long-term
behavior will be coexistence; and if ρ > (a + 1)/2 and
ρ < ρ∗, limit cycles are possible if τβ is sufficiently large,
otherwise there will be coexistence. The curve bounding
the region in (a, ρ) space where limit cycles are possible
has been computed numerically.
In sum, we see that limit cycles can arise from feedback
between the overall population density and the fraction
of controlled agents in the population. Critically, these
oscillations emerge only when the feedback is sufficiently
delayed, in which case they occur over a wide range of ρ
and a values.
B. Scenario 2: Controlled processing increases
resource availability
Here, we leave β fixed and instead link ρ to x, using the
same formulation for ρ here as for β in Scenario 1. This
models a scenario in which controlled agents enrich the
environment, say by creating technologies that increase
resource abundance for everybody. Again, we add a lag
that represents the time required for the development of
such technologies and their impact on the environment
to occur. This gives rise to the following system:
x˙ = x(fC − (xfC + (1− x)fA))
ρ˙ =
x− ρ
τρ
. (8)
After insertion of (3) and (4), Eq. (8) becomes
x˙ = (x− 1)x
(
a
a− βρ+ ρ+ βρx +
ρ+ βρx
a+ 1
− 1
)
ρ˙ =
x− ρ
τρ
. (9)
Again, x˙ is the same in the system without feedback,
and in equilibrium ρ = x. For the sake of illustration,
we fix a = 1.5 and examine the dynamics as a function
of β and τρ (Fig. 4(a)). We find three possible types of
long-term dynamics: coexistence of automatic and con-
trolled agents (region 1, stable interior fixed point); limit
cycles in which both types of agents are present but their
relative abundances oscillate (region 2, unstable interior
fixed point), and dominance of automatic agents (region
3, no interior fixed point). As Fig. 4(a) indicates, limit
cycles exist only if 0.249 < ρ < 0.4 and τρ > 446.3. The
Hopf bifurcation curve bounding the limit cycle region
has been calculated analytically, but is too complicated
to show here. Figures 4(b)-(d) show time series for sam-
ple trajectories from within each region.
There is an important difference between these dy-
namics and the dynamics studied in Scenario 1 when x
and β were positively correlated: in Scenario 1, domi-
nance of controlled but not automatic agents was pos-
sible, whereas here in Scenario 2, the opposite is true.
Only automatic agents can dominate. Moreover, this
dominance by automatic agents occurs only if a > 1.
Next we ask how the dynamics of (9) depend on the
parameter a, which reflects the strength of diminishing
returns. We find that only the three types of long-term
dynamics observed in Fig. 4(a) are possible if a > 1, but
that more complex dynamics emerge when a < 1 (Figs. 5
and 6). Figure 6 characterizes the dynamics as a function
of β and τρ for a = 1/2. The long-term dynamics of (9)
for a < 1 sometimes depend on the initial conditions, in
a manner that can be summarized as follows:
• Regions 3 and 5: dominance of automatic agents.
• Region 2: either limit cycle oscillations of the two
strategies, or dominance of automatic agents, de-
pending on the initial conditions.
• Region 4: either oscillations or coexistence, de-
pending on the initial conditions.
• Regions 6 and 7: either dominance of automatic
agents or coexistence, depending on the initial con-
ditions.
• Region 8: oscillation of the two strategies, domi-
nance of automatic agents, or coexistence, depend-
ing on the initial conditions.
In summary, adding feedback between the fraction of
the population that uses controlled processing and the
availability of resources can also give rise to limit cycles
when the feedback is sufficiently delayed. Compared to
the (x, β) system discussed in Scenario 1 (Section IV.A) ,
however, limit cycles occur over a smaller range of (β, a)
combinations. Furthermore, the dynamics of the (x, ρ)
system of Scenario 2 are substantially more complex than
those of the (x, β) system of Scenario 1.
C. Scenario 3: Controlled processing increases
both competition and resource availability
Finally, we consider the case in which x influences both
β and ρ. To do so, we use a three differential equation
7FIG. 4: (Color online) Bifurcation analysis of Eq. (9)
with a = 1.5 and τρ = 1000. (a) Stability diagram.
Hopf bifurcation, blue curve. (b) Time series of region 1
with β = 0.2. (c) Time series of region 2 with β = 0.3.
(d) Time series of region 3 with β = 0.45.
FIG. 5: (Color online) Characterization of (9) with
a = 1.5.
FIG. 6: (Color online) Bifurcation diagram of (9) with
a = 0.5. Hopf bifurcation, blue curve; fold bifurcation
(saddle-node coalescence) of cycles, purple curve;
Homoclinic bifurcation, orange curve.
system that includes the original replicator equation for
x˙, as well as the β˙ equation from (6) and the ρ˙ equation
from (9), with the use of two different time-constants,
τρ and τβ , for the two different environmental feedback
equations. Thus our system is given by
x˙ = x(fC − (xfC + (1− x)))
β˙ =
x− β
τβ
ρ˙ =
x− ρ
τρ
. (10)
After insertion of (3) and (4), Eq. (10) becomes
x˙ = (x− 1)x
(
a
a− βρ+ ρ+ βρx +
ρ+ βρx
a+ 1
− 1
)
β˙ =
x− β
τβ
ρ˙ =
x− ρ
τρ
. (11)
We perform numerical simulations to demonstrate that
limit cycles can also arise in the 3D system, as shown in
Fig. 7 with a = 1.5. We see that limit cycles are possible
as long as neither τβ nor τρ are too small.
8FIG. 7: (Color online) Analysis of (11) with a = 1.5,
τρ = 1500, τβ = 1000. (a) Parametric plot. (b) Time
series.
V. DISCUSSION
Here we have introduced an analytically tractable
model of the evolution of dual-process agents. Our model
focuses on intertemporal choice, with agents foraging for,
and competing over, goods which they consume to gen-
erate fitness. Agents that use automatic processing are
at an advantage when acquiring goods because of their
speed and efficiency, but immediately consume any goods
they acquire in short-sighted fashion. Controlled agents,
conversely, engage in long-term planning and make better
use of the goods they manage to acquire.
Within this framework, the agents’ world is
parametrized by ρ, the availability of resources (defined
as the average probability of finding a good per unit
time), and β, the competitive advantage of automatic
agents (the increased likelihood of automatic agents ac-
quiring a good over controlled agents). Our analysis al-
lows us to characterize which parts of the (ρ, β) param-
eter space lead to dominance of automatic or controlled
processing, bistability, or coexistence, as well as the con-
ditions under which limit cycles arise.
In particular, we find that natural selection favors con-
trolled agents when ρ and β are both small (poor worlds
with little competition), automatic agents when ρ and
β are both large (rich worlds with substantial competi-
tion), coexistence when ρ is large and β small (rich worlds
with little competition), and bistability when ρ is small
and β large (poor worlds with substantial competition).
Furthermore, we find that limit cycles are a robust fea-
ture of adding environmental feedback whereby a greater
frequency of controlled agents leads to either higher β,
higher ρ, or both. Critically, however, the feedback must
be sufficiently lagged in order for limit cycles to emerge.
Thus our analyses demonstrate the key role that feed-
back between the population and the environment plays
in population (and ecological) dynamics. Such feedback
can lead to cyclical dynamics that are otherwise impos-
sible in a two-species competition model. Critically, en-
vironmental feedback is absent from typical evolutionary
game-theoretic models, in which the game parameters
are fixed, and only the population make-up varies over
time [27, 28]. By extending the replicator equation to
include linkage between the population and one or more
of the game parameters, we allow a richer range of dy-
namics that help to explain cyclical dynamics observed
in human history.
In the interest of analytical tractability, our model
makes a number of simplifying assumptions. Most impor-
tantly, we consider the limiting case of entirely automatic
agents competing with entirely controlled agents. In re-
ality, agents exist on a continuum of inclination towards
automaticity versus control. We also consider a highly
simplified foraging environment, and a simple decision
rule for controlled agents (spread consumption out evenly
over the expected waiting period until the next good is
acquired). We are confident, however, that these partic-
ular simplifications did not distort our results, however,
based on our prior computer simulation work [26]. These
simulations had agents that could engage in both auto-
matic and controlled processing, and examined a much
more complex foraging environment. Nonetheless, our
simplified model recreates the same dynamics as the more
complex simulations.
The framework we introduce here can be extended in
many ways to assess the impact of other simplifications,
and to explore other questions. For example, spatial
structure could be added [30–32], agents could differ in
the extent to which they impact the game parameters,
or the game parameters could vary cyclically over time
(instead of, or in addition to, variation caused by the pop-
ulation) [33, 34]. Our basic framework could also be ap-
plied to study dual-process cognition in domains beyond
intertemporal choice, such as risky choice [17, 35] or co-
operation in social dilemmas [14, 36, 37]. In summary, we
have introduced an evolutionary game-theoretic model of
dual-process agents who make decisions using either au-
tomatic or controlled cognitive processing, and who not
only compete with each other but also affect their envi-
ronment. Our model demonstrates how the tendency for
controlled processing to enrich the environment or grow
the population undermines the advantages of controlled
cognition, leading to the eventual invasion of automatic-
ity and short-sightedness. Thus our model sheds light
on historical cycles through which controlled processing,
and associated phenomena such as careful planning and
technological innovation, may rise and fall. The success
of controlled cognition naturally leads to its own demise.
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